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An Examination of the Ecosystems
Perspective in Consideration of New
Theories in Biology and Thermodynamics.
BARNEY McDOWELL
Eco-systems perspective and its predecessor, systems theory, have been
put forth as the guiding methodological framework for social work. In
fact, operationally and theoretically most of these formulations are mech-
anistic and dualistic. Social work systems theory claims ecology, thermo-
dynamics, and biology as its historical roots. It is, therefore, incumbent
on the profession to examine the fundamentals of those disciplines. This
paper examines social work's eco-systemic formulations in light of new
hypotheses in biology and thermodynamics as well as the ecological crisis
of our times. Professionalism will then be discussed as the operational
demonstration of social work's mechanistic philosophy.
Social work theorists have invoked general systems theory
[GST] and ecology as the guiding lights for social work practice.
GST is the cross disciplinary search for a shared core of epis-
temologies to explain the most complex of systems. In social
work formulations of eco-systems perspective, Allen-Meares
and Lane (1987) reference the fields of ethology and ethnology
while Siporin (1980) cites biological ecology and information
theory. Numerous others reference an outdated (Martin &
O'Connor, 1989) and non-consensual interpretation of the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics (Weber, Depew, & Smith, 1988,
p. 3) and almost all credit general systems theory. While social
work literature references these "hard" sciences to corroborate
their theories, that same literature leaves the reader without an
examination of the philosophical assumptions of that science.
In this paper, some core concepts and assumptions of systems
and ecological theory are explored as well as new hypotheses
in biology and thermodynamics. Biologist Rupert Sheldrake's
hypothesis of morphogenesis with his critique of the theory of
genetic causality will be introduced along with Nobel Laureate
Illya Prigogine's non-equilibrium thermodynamics. In an at-
tempt to jolt the reader across the premise-boundaries of the
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"normal science" of social work, their theories are offered 1) to
underscore the inadequacy of the engineering and marketing
paradigm which dominates social work and 2) to support the
alternative institutional forms suggested by Ivan Illich (1971).
The Failure of Engineered Systems
In the 1960's, creation of genetic hybrid seeds was hailed
as an end to human starvation-the green revolution. Hybrids
were manufactured which produced greatly increased yields.
There were warnings in the early 1970's that these seed
varieties might not withstand adverse conditions like drought.
This is exactly what happened. Famine and the death of mil-
lions around the globe resulted (Mooney, 1979) when hybrid
seeds failed against fungus, high winds, and unusual weather
conditions! The hybrid seeds didn't have the encoded "wis-
dom" of native seed varieties which benefitted from centuries
of relationships with earth and elements. By 1984, there was
a scramble around the world to recover forgotten buckets of
"native" seed varieties from the barns of forgotten farmers.
Narrowly purposeful geneticists failed to account for the mul-
titude of transactions which besieged their hybrids. Perhaps, a
sub-system (hybrids under experimental conditions) was suc-
cessfully engineered, but the whole system was beyond engi-
neering control. Of course, those millions of deaths stand in
the shadow of political and economic forces as well as the
Promethean scientific arrogance of geneticists. The geneticists
didn't err alone or simply by miscalculation. In Bateson's (1972)
terms, their errors were grounded in our society's self-selecting
epistemology: the purpose of controlling nature as paradigm.
Bateson (1972) drew very large system boundaries in order
to bring into relief the importance of human purpose. The com-
mon engineering application of systems concepts involves
defining the system boundaries beyond which all effects can
be calculated as negligible. A refrigerator which gives off too
much heat must be redesigned. The insulation in a high rise
is weighed against energy loss on a cost-efficiency basis. In
the 1980's, global warming was just one example of startling
feedback about the choice of boundary design which postulated
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heat exchanges as negligible. Holes in the ozone are feedback
about the neglect of a different boundary vector, the molecular
nature of refrigerants passing across that boundary. Unfortu-
nately, so called eco-systemic solutions typically seek to add
more sophisticated feedback loops, more refined controls, to re-
engineer the disasters of our engineering and marketing way
of life; in this they are merely a subset of the mechanistic
problem-producing-solution which excludes fundamental vec-
tors of human consciousness like purpose or wishfulness. Where
we eliminate that feedback, we have ceased thinking in terms
of broad systems concepts and revert to an engineering mode of
linear causality: How do we build the system in order to cause
the desired effect?
Bertalanffy (1981, p. 116) warns that systemic ideas are most
often merely applications of engineering principles to more
complex problems. That is, purpose and goals remain primary
though increased degree of difficulty is acknowledged. Typical
of the social work field, Longres (1990, p. 8), a systems ad-
vocate, dismisses Native American Russell Means' critique of
European rationalism and "its assumption that progress is pos-
sible through the use of technological inventions-including the
technology of social welfare-to overcome human suffering."
Longress asserts without argument that western social work
must continue to try to fix things: "In the meantime, social
service workers ought to realize that progress through the use
of rational planned change ... is what social services stand for".
In other words, he presupposes the priority of rational purpose-
fulness to effect control irrespective of how large the system is.
Ironically, he dismisses Mean's critique without a rational argu-
ment. However, general systems analysis indicates that bound-
ary considerations for social welfare are mind boggling from a
atomistic perspective. While in physics the movement of two
bodies in a gravitational field can easily be predicted, the three
body problem is so complex that it hasn't been solved in 400
years (Hagihara, Y., 1970). Bremmerman estimated that 1047 is
the most information that can be computed per gram of matter
in an imaginary computer of fantastic efficiency, but permu-
tations of elements in very simple systems quickly go beyond
the "Bremmerman limit" (Klir, 1972). Consider the formation of
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something as simple as a visual image; it is far too complex to
be explained in terms of the summation of transactions between
component cells (Ashby, 1972). Systems theory will never be
adequate to explain human behavior in terms of calculating
transactions in order to control life though it may appear so
in the short run or a narrow context.
Examples of current ecological "solutions" are more efficient
refrigerators, non-leaking microwaves or drugs with fewer side
effects for schizophrenia. However, these solutions still focus
on the paramount if implicit system dimension of performance
within the same purpose. Wolfgang Sachs (1990) reviewed over
eighty world watch documents, reporting on the state of the
earth's ecology. Virtually, all of these argue for efficiency and
preservation as a solution to ecological disasters. However, there
are many others, including ecofeminists (Plant, 1990), with
Sachs who expose the racist, sexist, and ecologically disastrous
effects of this philosophy. For example, the efficiency model
indicates to end exploitation of the Amazon because Amazonian
plants are the resource for many major drug discoveries. The
use and dominance of nature are still the underlying philoso-
phy in this engineering solution. In contrast to the engineer-
ing efficiency paradigm, many indigenous cultures historically
considered themselves and the earth through a sufficiency or
wholistic, "as is" perspective, alive and worth revering as an
expression of life-not as a resource for the human form of life.
Social Work: Determined to Engineer Life
Allen-Meares and Lane (1987) adopt eight key concepts of
"eco-systems perspectives" for social work assessments. One of
these emphasizes determinism as a property of living systems
analysis: "The relationship of the parts within the ecosystem are
considered to be orderly, structured, lawful, and deterministic
[emphasis added]" (p. 518). As discussed later, this is antithet-
ical to much of modern science. Determinism implies a set of
laws which if known along with the initial conditions of the
system permit prediction of the system's behavior. Then to the
degree that complementary technology is available, the system
can be engineered for the desired result. Social work language
is clearly an engineering/marketing metaphor. Populations are
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targeted. Social services are tested by experts and prepackaged
before delivery. Linear accountability is supposedly based on
a cost-benefit analysis. In social work lore, the distinction be-
tween human service organizations are the people themselves"
(Holland & Petchers, 1987, p. 204). But there is no scientific basis
for that raw dualistic analogy; it is an engineering, manufactur-
ing metaphor!
The deterministic view serves social work's conception of
professionalism. Professionals stake the right to determine in
theory and in court the "self-determinism" of the client. This
legal/moral claim is based on a extension of what is ratio-
nally right or wrong as distilled through the prevailing du-
alistic paradigm. Professionalism denies creative self initiative
by delimiting the boundaries of self-determinism by virtue of
superior theoretical and technological knowledge. Counter-
poised to this stands the work of leading intellectuals as well
as indigenous people. The life work of Ivan Illich (1971, 1976,
1977) illustrates the destructive effects of professionalism to
cultural and biological diversity. With Illich, Noam Chomsky
(1987, p. 37) and Felix Guattari (Elkaim, Prigogine, Guattari,
Stengers, & Denenbourgh, 1982, p. 67) decry the professional
guild mentality's repression of the boundaries of inquiry by pro-
mulgating the internalization of the political presuppositions of
the status quo. Many indigenous people and ecologists around
the world are increasingly vocal against professional experts
whose engineered solutions of re-engineering the ecology of
the earth boomerang back with insulting destruction (Mooney,
1979); Woodhouse, 1987; D'Souza, 1990). Further as this essay
emphasizes, recent scientific analyses in both biology and ther-
modynamics have dismantled determinism.
Sheldrake: Genetic Morphogenesis Is Dead
Rupert Sheldrake (1981, 1988) firmly establishes the failure
of the consensual atomistic attempt to explain the forms of life in
terms of genetic determinism. This is relevant to social workers
who labor in pathological model-environments abounding with
linear or cybernetic explanations of, for example, the genetic ba-
sis or predisposition for alcoholism, schizophrenia, or physical
disease. The implications of his theorizing extends conceptions
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of what an ecosystem is as well as the very presuppositions
of science. His work resonates with the thermodynamic work
of Nobel Laureate, Illya Prigogine; both conclude that the so-
called laws of nature are evolving and both emphasize the
self-organizing principles of natural phenomena. Mechanistic
interpretations of professionalism in the name of eco-systemic
ideas will be addressed in light of the theories of Sheldrake and
Prigogine.
Morphogenesis means the coming into being (genesis) of
form (morpho). Explaining morphogenesis has been at the crux
of Western biological, philosophical, religious and systems
thought. In the 20th century, the prevailing belief of profes-
sional biologists has been genetic determinism; genes cause the
shape, color, size, etc. of your body within the constraints of the
environment. The genotype is the template for the phenotype
in a one way casual relationship. In somewhat more technical
terms, Sheldrake calls this the central dogma of biology: "ge-
netic material acts as a template for the synthesis of proteins,
but never the reverse" (1988, p. 80). Over most of this century it
was heresy to challenge this view. However, in the last decade
many biologists have come to the firm conclusion that genes or
gene programs explain very little of morphogenesis.
Materialist versus Vitalist Philosophy and Science
Sheldrake discusses the evolution of morphogenetic theory
as a dialectic between materialist and vitalist philosophy. The
dominant modality of science is materialist: life processes can
be described in terms of machine models which are governed
by the laws of nature. For example, the earth has a mass which
is acted upon by gravity, producing movement which wouldn't
exist in the absence of the gravitational field. The law of gravity
is considered to be constant, eternal and independent of the
earth's existence. At the molecular level there are gravitational,
electromagnetic, and sub-atomic forces which determine chem-
ical reactions. Natural selection, popularly considered a mecha-
nistic biological law, makes an offer that can't be refused to each
particular genetic configuration. The deterministic, mechanistic
assumption is that the behavior of larger organisms will be ex-
plained in terms of cellular, biochemical, genetic, and ultimately
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sub-atomic forces once the details are sufficiently articulated
through physics and chemistry.
Sheldrake traces the philosophical roots of this mechanistic
materialist view back to the dualism of Plato, who thought the
real world to be a mere reflection of unchanging ideals; this
parallels scientific changeless laws of nature (ideals) describing
everything from the motion and changes of planets to the effects
of human hormones. But this model is dualistic-built on a
contradictory foundation. Changes (in nature) are described as
derived from changeless laws (in archetypal or mathematical
realm). In other words, hardcore materialists base their theories
on purely transcendent, eternal laws; they are metaphysicians
underneath.
Opposing the mechanistic mode is the vitalist tradition.
Aristotle's concept of entelechy posits a soul which informs
everything with a template of its destiny (including its form).
Many indigenous tribal people held such a world view, some-
times known as Animism. This view foreshadows Lamarck's
hypothesis that structure follows function. For example, giraffes
grew long front legs and necks out of necessity in a environment
with lots of high food and little low food; future generations of
giraffes could inherit those traits. Darwin couldn't escape this
completely; he postulated a nivus formativus, an inner creative
force for change. However, he opted to dismiss the degree of its
creative potential in comparison to natural selection. Sheldrake
documents the whole history of the struggle between the two
world views and demonstrates the inadequacy of the material-
istic explanations. Though much empirical evidence supported
this intuitively appealing model throughout this century, the
functionalist view lost favor in the Western Hemisphere where
a Platonic template, as a commitment to control nature, dom-
inated not only biology but all scientific methodologies and,
perhaps, the ecosystem of the entire earth.
Historically, the idea that genes could determine morpho-
genesis ran into trouble. "What genes are known to do is to
code information for the sequence of chemical building blocks
in RNA and protein molecules. Thus they help to provide a
detailed understanding of the way in which organisms in-
herit their biochemical potentialities. What they are not known
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to do is to code for morphogenesis for inherited patterns of
behavior" (Sheldrake, 1988, p. 88). Sheldrake quotes Brenner:
"At the beginning it was said that the answer to the under-
standing of development was going to come from a knowledge
of the molecular mechanisms of gene control. I doubt whether
anyone believes that any more. The molecular mechanisms look
boringly simple, and they don't tell us what we want to know.
We have to try to discover the principles of organization" (p. 94).
To remedy the insufficiently complex gene, the concepts
of selfish genes and gene program were invoked. Biologists
went on a search to decode the program with the promise
of one day molding life itself. Genes were suddenly spoken
of as competitive, selfish and ruthless. In this they followed
Darwin who apologizes for personifying nature because it's
"difficult to avoid this ambiguity" (Sheldrake, 1988, p. 272).
A gene program was postulated to inhere in the sequencing
of individual gene molecules. Numerous objections arose to
this concept and many biologists recognized its inadequacy
while continuing to propagate it. An international group of
biologists concluded in 1981, that "studies of the development
of the nervous system have shown that the notion of genetic
programming is not only defective at the conceptual level but
also represents a misinterpretation of the knowledge already
available from developmental studies" (Gerhardt, et al., 1982,
p. 112). For this paper's thesis, the paramount objection is that
"program" is inconsistent with the mechanistic claims of a
materialist world.
Programs are described as "instructions", "messages", and
"information". The latter recalling the informing notion of ent-
elechy. Underneath its hard science veneer, a genetic program
has a heart-it is a vitalist idea. Normal science never left the
metaphysical realm because it always depended on the ideal
of eternal transcendent laws. In a materialist dominated con-
text, it became embarrassing to inquire where the animistic
program inhered. Sheldrake proposes an alternative synthesis
sketched below.
The presence or absence of particular genes will strongly
correlate with differences in form. For instance in Drosophila, a
Examination of the Ecosystems Perspective 57
fruit fly, the presence of a certain gene may result in a double set
of wings which do not appear with statistical regularity without
that gene. This does not prove genetic causality.
To see the force of this point, consider the analogy of a radio set. A
mutation in one of its transistors might cause the sounds that it is
producing to become distorted; and a mutation in one of the com-
ponents in its turning circuit might cause the set to pick up another
radio station; an entirely different series of sounds would come
out of the loudspeakers. But the fact that mutations in the set's
components can cause differences in the sounds the set produces
does not prove that these sounds are determined or programmed
by the components of the set. These are necessary for the reception
of the program, but the sounds are in fact coming from radio
stations and are transmitted through the electro-magnetic field.
The mutant component is not a component "for" a particular
program or type of sound" [emphasis added] (Sheldrake, 1988,
p. 90).
Sheldrake postulates an immaterial biologic field paralleling the
electromagnetic radio field. The fields have morphogenetic po-
tential. He suggests that biologic fields evolve-they are living;
behavior of creatures is governed by the fields but is also formed
by behavior over time. Fields evolve out of experience through
repetition over time. Laws of nature are like learned habits.
The more a pattern is repeated, the more likely it is to stabilize
and recur, but they are living, changing fields. Of course, some
patterns like relationships in sub-atomic particles have had tril-
lions of trillions of repetitions and so they are likely to appear
as absolute. Relatively new patterns like functional behaviors
of animals are newer and thus less grooved. Sheldrake cites
many examples which are consistent with his hypothesis. A
few will be mentioned here not to advocate for his particular
theory, but to underscore the inappropriateness of ignoring the
contradictions in the consensual view.
There is an apocryphal version of morphic resonance called
the hundredth monkey theory. The story goes that after one
monkey learned to wash sandy tubers to be used as food then
other monkeys quickly learned the same behavior. The real
surprise is that when a critical number of monkeys learned the
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behavior then monkeys on other isolated islands suddenly were
able to wash tubers for food. Sheldrake explores this theme
through many dimensions including animal behaviors in the
wild and in the lab, human learning behaviors, evolution, and
crystal formation. For example, an experimenter bred strains
of rats into dull and bright strains selected by learning exper-
iments. The current genetic model predicted that bright rats
will beget relatively brighter rats and vice versa. This is exactly
what did happen. However, succeeding generations of dull rats
actually learned faster and faster. This experiment followed sim-
ilar experiments performed at Harvard, Australia, and Scotland.
Assuming well designed experiments, this evidences a potential
contradiction in the genetic causality model. But according to
"'morphic resonance" theory, there is a learning field, a biolog-
ically sensitive field, which becomes more firmly "canalized"
with repetition. a similar explanation is consistent with the
formation of crystals, the behavior of birds, and experiments
with human memory.
In this cursory consideration numerous alternative common
sense objections may occur to the reader. There is no claim
that there is sufficient evidence to elevate the morphic reso-
nance hypothesis to a theory. Space does not permit a thorough
review of Sheldrake's pragmatic and methodical approach in
examining the existing and alternative models. A few points
need to be stressed. Less stable fields are subject to more rad-
ical changes; they have a more responsive nature and thus are
less predictable. Thus descriptions of fruit fly behaviors are
less likely to maintain over time than descriptions of gravity.
Experiments in fields subject to more rapid changes over time
are less subject to the (usually assumed) experimental criteria
of repeatability.
The implications are obvious for contemporary society char-
acterized by instability and change. In no way, can it be
proven that human or biological ecosystems are in equilibrium
presently. Sheldrake cites the work of Nobel Laureate Illya
Prigogine in the self-organizing principles of non-equilibrium
thermodynamics in developing his hypothesis.
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Prigogine: Atomistic Determinism is Dead
Classical physics wrote a set of prescriptions (laws) which
applied over all time and, thus, emphasized stability and perma-
nence. Prigogine points out that there was no room in these for-
mulations for non-cyclic changes over time-evolution. Rather,
than viewing the world as subjected to sovereign laws of nature
cut from an external template, Prigogine was able to model out
innate self-organizing principles in chemical reactions, ecosys-
tems, regulatory cellular processes, and traffic patterns among
many other applications. His work draws on an examination of
the history of philosophical and scientific thought (Prigogine &
Stengers, 1984) and highly technical mathematical and chemical
investigation (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). The self-organization
of systems in contrast to an external Platonic and determin-
istic organizational template is the main aspect of his work
that I wish to emphasize. Prigogine demonstrated that change
towards increased complexity (decreased entropy) takes place in
far from equilibrium conditions. This occurs when fluctuations
or errors in random activity are amplified and grow into viable
"dissipative structures". The growth of a town along a river is a
simple example of a dissipative structure, a configuration which
is propelled to greater complexity through a continuous flow of
energy. Suppose that a town comes into being for an industrial
purpose. A town maintaining at equilibrium for years, may
experience economic or social changes so that while the town
may be continue to appear stable, under the surface turmoil
is brewing and it is far from equilibrium. Then, a very small
stream of new energy may be incorporated such that the town
takes a quantum leap or, conversely, a city may die quickly
when a small, but critical, flow of energy is cut off.
In some localities, far from equilibrium conditions, instabil-
ities trigger new structures. A phenomenon called the Benard'
convection cell illustrates this. Picture a glass casserole dish
filled with water at room temperature. There are trillions of
molecules bumping into each other and exchanging energy in an
amorphous pattern of random collisions. If you put your finger
on the side of the dish, some nearby molecules pick up the body
heat and move faster with more energy. However, the extra
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energy of any particular molecule is instantly redistributed-
at high atomic speeds there are so many collisions per micro-
second that the energy of the body heat is virtually instantly
diffused through the whole system. Under the old atomistic
assumption, the behavior of a small group of molecules must
conform to the dictates of the overall system norms-tempera-
ture, pressure, volume, and random movement patterns. But
this isn't so.
Now, imagine that heat energy is applied to the bottom
of the dish. At a critical temperature, cellular patterns, called
Benard' convection cells, appear in the water. The width of these
cells is almost a centimeter, 10,000,000 times the distance of
molecular forces--deterministic molecular forces can't explain
the patterns which are self-organizing phenomenon on a dif-
ferent logical level than molecular forces. While the molecules
of one convection cell rotate to the right, in the adjacent cell
rotation goes to the left. Interestingly, the direction of rotation
can never be predicted-it is indeterminate.
The importance of the non-equilibrium vector is crucial.
Consider, the moment just before the critical temperature
is reached. The water has more energy; the molecules move
much faster though their movement is still amorphously cha-
otic, imagine something like snow on a TV screen. Though the
system exhibits the same structural properties, it is now far from
equilibrium; then, a finger to the side of the dish though pro-
viding a minute amount of energy is a sufficient amplification
to set off the new inherent structure-convection cells-which can
accommodate more energy. Other experimental designs using
water and the infusion of energy demonstrate a sequence of
structural development: One structural configuration remains
stable while accommodating increasing energy flows until, at a
critical point, a turbulent period ensues followed by a reorgani-
zation to greater complexity which accommodates more energy
(Swinney & Gollub, 1978).
These self-organizing and indeterminate features in far from
equilibrium conditions can be demonstrated in many other
more complex phenomena in both organic and inorganic activ-
ity. Hoffman (1981) and Elkaim (1985) have both proposed this
notion from Prigogine's work for a theory of family therapy. In
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processes far more complex than convection cells, the dissipa-
tion of energy may amplify initial instabilities to favor further
instabilities which may result in new evolutionary structures.
Ferguson (1979, p. 165) summarizes:
The more complex or coherent a structure, the greater the next
level of complexity. Each transformation makes the next one like-
lier. Each new level is even more integrated and connected than
the one before, requiring a greater flow of energy for maintenance,
and, is, therefore, less stable. To put it another way, flexibility
begets flexibility. As Prigogine said at a higher level of complexity
"the nature of the laws of nature changes".
In traditional thermodynamic explanation, the statistical
chances were virtually zero for a small sub-system of billions
of molecules to behave coherently beyond the macro statistical
laws governing the behavior of those molecules. That was the
thermodynamic version of determinism. But systems demon-
strate spontaneous creative organization which is not predict-
able (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989). While Sheldrake's work is more
explicitly organic in allowing for the innate "intelligence" of
systems, Prigogine describes creative self organization through
random processes which defy prediction.
Implicit Theory of Institutional Structure
In contrast to Allen-Meares and Lane's (1980) deterministic
ecosystems approach for social workers, Prigogine (1989, p. 399)
is explicitly non-deterministic: "The notion of instability has in
some way been ideologically suppressed for the phenomenon
of instability leads naturally to very serious problems ... The
world of unstable phenomena is not a world we can control, any
more than we can control human society in the sense that ex-
trapolation in classical physics led us to believe." He comments
that there are no risks or ethical dilemmas in a deterministic
world.
In a dialogue with Prigogine about family therapy and non-
equilibrium thermodynamics, Guattari (Elkaim, et al., 1982,
p. 65) interprets Prigogine's work in opposition to "the strength-
ening of power groups that are interested in a policy of stan-
dardization". Guattari characterizes those policies as effected
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by a professional "scientific" superego which imports external
constraints on local systems. Of course, such standards are the
primary focus of social work institutions. Referring to the Coun-
cil on Social Work Education, Bernard (1987, p. 330) writes,
"the council carries out its purpose through accreditation and
other standard-setting activities". Similarly, the National Associ-
ation of Social Workers focuses on standardization. Battle (1987,
p. 333) summarizes: "The association works to advance and
unify the profession, to develop and institutionalize professional
standards".
Countering the professional chauvinism that imposes ex-
ternal standards, Illich (1976, p. 16) calls this the "Age of the
Disabling Professions". His work extends Marx's notion of
alienation from the means of production to the alienation from
the "very ability to do and to make". He defines an institu-
tional spectrum by reframing the political categories of left
and right which apply both to capitalist and socialist coun-
tries. Right wing institutions impose a predigested program on
others, organize production, and rely on unwilling or trained
consumption of their products and services. At the left end of
the spectrum, institutions facilitate activity defined by the user
(self-organizing) and offer relatively spontaneous use (indeter-
minate); their few regulations are geared to prevent the abuse
of general accessibility-not to enforce use. Law enforcement
and the military/defense complex are obvious right institutions,
but hiore profound is the insidious oppression of the educa-
tional system. Schools are compulsory at lower levels yet closed
at upper levels to those who don't consistently advance their
credentialed status. The telephone network (not the corporate
structure) offers an alternative; the phone system can be used
by virtually everyone-it is inexpensive to make an individual
call; it can be used virtually anytime of the day or night; it
can be used by anyone (including the hearing impaired to a
lesser extent). The postal system demonstrates similar access
and constraints. A typical restriction of these institutions is a law
to stop harassing phone calls or junk mail, not a requirement to
use. Parks and hotels are other examples towards the left of the
spectrum. The medical industry, with social work at its side,
tends toward the right.
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In Medical Nemesis, Illich (1976) makes the case that the com-
modity intrusiveness of medicine has expropriated the cultural
imagoes of healing, the ability of people to creatively suffer and
care for themselves. Birth and death have become medicalized
with enforced consumption of treatment. It is impossible to
make the case in this brief space given the pervasiveness of
the myth of modern medicine. Only a few examples can be
discussed. Most of the total decline in the death rate due to
scarlet fever, diphtheria, whooping cough and measles occurred
before the introduction of antibiotics or immunization. The vast
majority of successful drug interventions involve a few dozen
drugs which do not require a doctor to administer except by
laws requiring doctors. Most of the reduction in infant mortality
was due to sterile procedures. One out of five children admitted
to a research hospital emerge with an iatrogenic disease.
Specific iatrogenic disease isn't the target of this critique,
rather cultural theft is-political orthodoxy masquerading as
scientific truth! Medicine "reinforces a morbid society that
encourages people to become consumers"; this yields a cultural
iatrogenesis which "consists in the paralysis of healthy response
to suffering, impairment, and death" (Illich, 1976, p. 33). Li-
censing requirements, whether in education, construction, or
psychotherapy, constitute a systems boundary which neglects
the healing aspect for people in actively self-organizing one's
healing which is, de facto, characterized as passive consump-
tion. Under the auspices of a Platonic professionalism, accredita-
tion and licensing standards perpetrate this type of iatrogenesis
which is not only racist but at the core of alienation in the
modern world.
Professionalism versus Self-determinism
and Self-Organization
In Germain's (1980) discussion of professionalism in health
care settings from an "ecological perspective" her primary con-
cern is the social worker's professional status visa vie the med-
ical profession: "With competence and identity well in hand,
a hospital's social work staff and individual social workers
are in a position to gain professional autonomy" (Germain,
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1980, p. 1). By autonomy she is "referring to a fully account-
able and responsible practice through mechanisms for quality
assurance, peer review, and consumer evaluation" (Germain,
1980, p. 1). Resonating with most historical social work analysis,
Germain acknowledges "concern for reducing social distance
and power differences between worker and client" and dutifully
qualifies it by affirming a "commitment to mutuality and reci-
procity between client and practitioner to the degree permitted
by the client's age, physical condition, capacities, and life style"
(Germain, 1980, p. 6). Are we to assume that professional exper-
tise will define the "degree permitted"? Unlike Sheldrake and
Prigogine, Germain doesn't discuss the philosophical or histor-
ical premises underlying the concepts of accountable or profes-
sional. The assumption is that health is appropriate adaptation
to the environmental norm but environment is then defined in
terms of professionalism. For example, of 15 factors describing
"environmental needs", second on the list compiled by Hep-
worth and Larsen (1990, p. 248) is "access to specialized health
care services (e.g. physicians, dentists, physical therapists, hos-
pitals, nursing homes)". Germain implies that the institutional
structure of medical settings is scientifically consistent with the
client's best interest.
Crediting Germain as a major contributor in the evolution
of social work's use of systems theory, Martin and O'Connor
(1989, p. 76) flail against the tyranny of an outdated conception
of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (1989, p. 51). They are
direct in confronting the facts that professionals often have the
power to "determine the standards and procedures by which
deviants (or people with problems) are recognized" (Martin &
O'Connor, 1989, p. 97). Though careful to warn against reduc-
tionist tendencies ascribing ulterior motives to helping agents,
they echo Germain's definition of professional autonomy; in
their discussion of professional-client relationships, they con-
clude that "social workers' legitimacy rests on their education,
licensure, and employment credentials but particularly on their
employing organization" (Martin & O'Connor, p. 104). But the
vectors of "education", "licensure", and "employing agency"
do not reside in the client except as the client is an extension
of those institutions. Claims that the client issues the legitimacy
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as tax payer or voter is a distorted equation leading back to the
client as the legitimate source of society's inequities.
In stark contrast, Illich views the heteronomous aspect of
that "legitimacy" as the cutting edge of exploitation and racism.
I propose that education and licensure are stultifying institu-
tional boundaries and bias, which, by their nature, squelch
self-organization with the claims of expertise in a determinis-
tic and objectifying engineering technology. Graduate schools
supposedly scramble to find faculty candidates from political
minorities, but there wouldn't be a scramble if those schools
didn't give priority in hiring policies to doctoral degrees even
as devotion to "cultural competency" is claimed. A community
mental health center in a minority neighborhood hires a white
MSW to work with children who, the center claims, would
do better with a role model from their own culture and race.
However, the white person is hired because the MSW is given
higher priority over cultural resonance and knowledge.
Further Implications for Intervention
The CSWE and the entire accrediting-licensing nexus fits
Illich's (1971) institutional spectrum model. The set, called scope
of responsibility that can be assumed in society, is defined by
elements like post graduate degrees which are expensive and
require previous and culturally specific schooling-unless you
show a receipt for a B.S.W., you may not have the opportunity
to purchase an M.S.W. permitting legal participation in healing
at that level. Social Work schools proudly attempt to more
efficiently recruit political minorities who are only insufficient
to heal by virtue of the schools' participation in institution-
ally racist standardization claims. I am not opposing politically
expedient "cultural competency" requirements or affirmative
action hiring policies but rather placing them in the context
of standardization policies. In systems imagery, "technical and
managerial measures taken on any level to avoid damaging the
patient by his treatment tends to engender a self-reinforcing ia-
trogenic loop [feedback]... analogous to the escalating destruc-
tion generated by the polluting procedures used as antipollution
devices" (Illich, 1976, p. 34). I imagine an alternative graduate
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school in which groups of 12 to 24 students are supported to
make a creative response to social conditions. Their response,
judged by specific facts rather than an a priori template, would
meet the response of local conditions. Certainly, many groups
wouldn't produce in their terms or those of potential employers,
but others would flourish in creative self-organizing expression
that is currently cast in the shadow of the CSWE's brand of the
professional persona.
The organizational structures of Alcoholics Anonymous and
its many offshoots fit Illich's model of a left institution: everyone
is invited, it's accessible, and a minimum of rules (e.g., no cross
talk) prevents abuse of the common forum for listening and
speaking. Ironically, professionals find it necessary to refer their
clients to such free groups which provide a powerful healing
forum according to millions. Carl Jung, whose work evokes
Sheldrake and Prigogine, is credited with the inspiration for AA
by its founder (Lovern, 1985); Jung directed a client to a spiritual
journey for which the client was substituting alcoholic spirits.
Without demonstrating an isomorphic relationship between the
structure of AA and the philosophy which inspired it, I believe
the following examination of Jungian thought suggests potential
for incorporating principles of Prigoginian self-organization into
institutional interventions.
Jung's psychology referenced vast system boundaries calling
for an examination of specific empirical data whether in mythol-
ogy or clinical cases-the "extraordinary diversity of individ-
ual life necessitates constant modifications of theory" (Jung,
1954, Vol. 16, p. 41). In contrast to Freud's Newtonian template
(Grof, 1984) of sexuality as the deepest repression, Jung saw
God as the deepest repression; that is, God, not as an orthodox
belief, but as an empirical fact of the human psyche as evi-
denced in the historical data of literature and art. The psyche
emanates from the collective unconscious with boundaries so
vast that indeterminacy rules-spirit is marked first by "the
principle of spontaneous movement and activity" (Jung, 1958,
p. 67). Sheldrake (1988, p. 253) concludes that Jung's arche-
types are innate psychic structures or energy configurating pat-
terns corresponding to morphic resonant structures. Like
Prigoginian dissipative structures, Jung describes individuation
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as the development of increasingly refined awareness through
the progressive integration of different archetypal psychic struc-
tures, each of which holds more energy from the unconscious
than the previous constellation. If successful, that process cul-
minates in the integration of the archetypal energies of the Self
which is the name that he gives to the energy configurating
pattern which can accommodate the collective energies of lesser
archetypal structures. The Self has greater access to the energy
of the collective unconscious, a psychic commons which defies
engineering or conscious control by virtue of its vastness if
nothing else.
Lovern (1985) links AA and Jung to the clinical work of
Milton Erickson. Though not developed here, with several
authors (Hoffman, 1990; Elkaim, 1985) I wish to underscore the
implications of Prigogine's work for strategic clinical interven-
tions, particularly as developed by Erickson. Paralleling other
analyses (Rossi, 1985; Gordon and Meyers-Anderson, 1981),
Stern (1985) calls Erickson's approach the "theory of no-theory"
suggesting Jung's or Prigogine's caveat about distorting the
particular with general theory. Offering specific examples of
Prigogine's work adapted to therapy, Elkaim (1985) explores
the amplification of small fluctuations and indeterminacy to
strategic interventions with families. I suggest that elaboration
through the filter of dissipative structures will reveal structural
family therapy as a temporal subset of strategic therapy and
numerous powerful therapeutic techniques will be elucidated.
Conclusion
Much of social work literature about ecosystems perspective
hasn't examined the philosophical and scientific roots of its
assertions. I maintain that the unexamined premises and absurd
conclusion of a mechanistic "eco-systems" philosophy stems
from the political orthodoxy of institutional power relations
and momentum-certainly not in empirical data. Prigogine's
work has been offered (Elkaim, et al., 1982) as a refutation of
scientific rationales for deterministic "ecosystems perspective"
as well as institutional structures. I do not claim proof of the
viability of alternatives but, with Sheldrake, I reject professional
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experts' muddled materialist science, which serves as "legit-
imacy" for current institutional mandates, and, with Illich, I
assert my right to offer other institutional proposals. While it is
too great a leap to insist that Prigogine's work fully corroborates
Illich's institutional analysis, there are unmistakably correlating
themes. In any case, the failure of engineered "solutions" like
the green revolution and, indeed, the ecological crises of our
times calls for a reexamination of the scientific seal of approval
on the deterministic or engineering orientation of eco-systems
perspective as presented in social work literature.
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